Indian Says Bush Was Soft on Non-Proliferation
An article on Rediff.com says that India should support President Bush's re-election because he has been so soft on India's nuclear program. While this attitude may have been good for US-Indian relations, which have needed improvement, it has not been good for the global non-proliferation regime. The problem is that if India proliferates and gets away with it, then every other country will think that it has a right to do so, including Iran and North Korea.
After criticizing Kerry for his strong non-proliferation stand, the article by Colonel Dr Anil A Athale (retd) says, "President Bush on the other hand has been responsible for stalling and virtually killing the CTBT and stressed that he is concerned about the spread of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) to 'terrorist' groups. Bush also stressed his resolve to build the anti-missile defence shield." In other words, Bush opposes some non-proliferation efforts (the CTBT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and has limited other non-proliferation efforts to terrorist groups only (not countries in general). Presumably, he thinks that the anti-missile shield means that the US can live with proliferation.
The writer says, "Thanks to President Bush's pragmatic approach, the issue of Indian nuclear weapons got pushed to the background over the last four years and Indo-US relations flourished."
Friday, October 29, 2004
Why Did the US Ignore the IAEA?
The debate between Bush and Kerry over the missing explosives in al-Qaqaa ignores an important issue: why did the administration ignore the IAEA's designation of these explosives as important to a nuclear weapons program? Bush has said that the main reason for the invasion of Iraq was because Saddam had or was about to get weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear. Remember the mushroom cloud smoking gun?
Under those circumstances, the administration should have requested a list of designated nuclear-related sites from the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and then specifically assigned US troops to check on and secure those sites. The fact that the ABC News video shows US troops breaking an IAEA seal, having no idea what it was, indicates the poor training the troops got for their primary mission of protecting the US and the rest of the world from WMD.
The explosives were not WMD, but they are an important ingredient in making a nuclear weapon go bang, once you have the really important ingredient, fissile uranium or plutonium. Why weren't the troops briefed on this aspect of the invasion, and why was the IAEA's list of nuclear sites ignored? Partly because of the ill will between the Bush administration and the UN, and the UN's IAEA in particular. Bush singled out Hans Blix, who was heading up the UN's inspection effort, for particular personal insults, and apparently the US spied on Blix in the run up to the war. When you burn your bridges, as the US did before the war, you had better be right. It turns out that we were not right.
The debate between Bush and Kerry over the missing explosives in al-Qaqaa ignores an important issue: why did the administration ignore the IAEA's designation of these explosives as important to a nuclear weapons program? Bush has said that the main reason for the invasion of Iraq was because Saddam had or was about to get weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear. Remember the mushroom cloud smoking gun?
Under those circumstances, the administration should have requested a list of designated nuclear-related sites from the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and then specifically assigned US troops to check on and secure those sites. The fact that the ABC News video shows US troops breaking an IAEA seal, having no idea what it was, indicates the poor training the troops got for their primary mission of protecting the US and the rest of the world from WMD.
The explosives were not WMD, but they are an important ingredient in making a nuclear weapon go bang, once you have the really important ingredient, fissile uranium or plutonium. Why weren't the troops briefed on this aspect of the invasion, and why was the IAEA's list of nuclear sites ignored? Partly because of the ill will between the Bush administration and the UN, and the UN's IAEA in particular. Bush singled out Hans Blix, who was heading up the UN's inspection effort, for particular personal insults, and apparently the US spied on Blix in the run up to the war. When you burn your bridges, as the US did before the war, you had better be right. It turns out that we were not right.
Tuesday, October 26, 2004
American War Crimes
The Washington Post broke a story about the CIA's removal of prisoners from Iraq, although this appears to violate the Geneva Conventions. According to the Post, the Justice Department wrote a memo in defense of the practice. Although the memo was stamped "draft" and apparently never finalized, it was circulated to other agencies, and the CIA relied on it in undertaking the removals or "renditions."
On Sunday, the New York Times had a long article on the rewriting of military law after 9/11 to allow sending prisoners to Guantanamo, where the administration expected them to be beyond the reach of the US judicial system. The article says that the White House proponents of this system kept lawyers from other agencies -- including uniformed military lawyers and State Department lawyers -- out of the process because the White House considered them too soft.
The Washington Post broke a story about the CIA's removal of prisoners from Iraq, although this appears to violate the Geneva Conventions. According to the Post, the Justice Department wrote a memo in defense of the practice. Although the memo was stamped "draft" and apparently never finalized, it was circulated to other agencies, and the CIA relied on it in undertaking the removals or "renditions."
On Sunday, the New York Times had a long article on the rewriting of military law after 9/11 to allow sending prisoners to Guantanamo, where the administration expected them to be beyond the reach of the US judicial system. The article says that the White House proponents of this system kept lawyers from other agencies -- including uniformed military lawyers and State Department lawyers -- out of the process because the White House considered them too soft.
Bush Failures on Non-Proliferation
The Washington Post has a major article on the failures of Bush's non-proliferation policy, involving most of the biggies, but with relatively little focus on Iraq. After all, it turned out that Iraq wasn't really a non-proliferation threat. It also doesn't mention India, since India is sort of doing its own thing, except that the unmentioned free pass for India complicates enforcing the entire non-proliferation regime, such as it is, against anyone.
The article, however, has in depth information on Pakistan (and the free pass given to A.Q. Khan), North Korea (and the absence of a policy -- "no carrot, no stick and no talk"), Iran (where the US turned down several opportunities to negotiate), Libya (about which the UK was much more concerned than the US), and finally Russia. According to the article, "'The big gorilla in the basement is the material from Russia and Pakistan,' said Robert L. Gallucci, dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and a classified consultant to the CIA and Energy Department laboratories. 'This is the principal, major national security threat to the United States in the next decade or more. I don't know what's in second place.'" Regarding Nunn-Lugar, the article continues, "Securing the [Russian nuclear] materials is laborious, expensive and dangerous work. Bush decided to let two of the major programs lapse because Russia declined to accept a change in the agreement that would shield U.S. firms from liability for worker safety."
The other disturbing fact was that intelligence types are almost certain that A.Q. Khan was doing nuclear business with another country, but nobody knows which one, and Khan is not talking. Bush continues to coddle Khan and Pakistan because we need their help in the war on conventional terror. Apparently nuclear terror is not so important.
The Washington Post has a major article on the failures of Bush's non-proliferation policy, involving most of the biggies, but with relatively little focus on Iraq. After all, it turned out that Iraq wasn't really a non-proliferation threat. It also doesn't mention India, since India is sort of doing its own thing, except that the unmentioned free pass for India complicates enforcing the entire non-proliferation regime, such as it is, against anyone.
The article, however, has in depth information on Pakistan (and the free pass given to A.Q. Khan), North Korea (and the absence of a policy -- "no carrot, no stick and no talk"), Iran (where the US turned down several opportunities to negotiate), Libya (about which the UK was much more concerned than the US), and finally Russia. According to the article, "'The big gorilla in the basement is the material from Russia and Pakistan,' said Robert L. Gallucci, dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and a classified consultant to the CIA and Energy Department laboratories. 'This is the principal, major national security threat to the United States in the next decade or more. I don't know what's in second place.'" Regarding Nunn-Lugar, the article continues, "Securing the [Russian nuclear] materials is laborious, expensive and dangerous work. Bush decided to let two of the major programs lapse because Russia declined to accept a change in the agreement that would shield U.S. firms from liability for worker safety."
The other disturbing fact was that intelligence types are almost certain that A.Q. Khan was doing nuclear business with another country, but nobody knows which one, and Khan is not talking. Bush continues to coddle Khan and Pakistan because we need their help in the war on conventional terror. Apparently nuclear terror is not so important.
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