America's Relations with Pakistan Deteriorating
Pakistan is an important country to the US because it is an important ally in fighting terrorists in Afghanistan (who may live part-time in Pakistan), and it has nuclear weapons, the technology for which it has been willing in the past to sell to the highest bidder.
Despite the Bush administration's efforts to build lines of communication and friendship with Pakistan, the Los Angeles Times reports as a headline that "In Pakistan, U.S. Policies Foster Suspicion and Hatred." The article quotes several Pakistanis who used to be favorable to the US. About one, who enjoyed living in New York, the article says that now, "...With each passing day, Hamid's empathy is eroding. He believes that the Bush administration, by pursuing a foreign policy fixated on security, is turning a legitimate battle against terrorism into a campaign of hatred against Muslims.... Hamid said that in a country squeezed between Musharraf, a general who seized power in 1999, and Islamic extremists, there is little room for Western-educated moderates."
According to another source, "'I personally feel Americans are losing friends in Pakistan very, very rapidly,' said Shah Mahmood Qureshi, deputy parliamentary leader of the Pakistan People's Party, whose exiled leader, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was a close U.S. ally. 'When the realization finally comes, it'll be too late.'"
Saturday, October 30, 2004
New Marine Offensive in Falluja
All the main news outlets are predicting a new Marine offensive in Falluja soon. This goes back to my earlier posting on September 13, about orders that came from Washington telling the Marines to back off during their first offensive, making them look cowardly. The first offensive started after American security contractors were killed in Falluja and strung up for all to see.
The new offensive seems as politically controlled as the first, which is tough for the Marines who have to carry it out. It seems pretty clear that it is being delayed until too late to influence the US election, or perhaps the threat of the offensive is being used to win the votes of hawks who were disappointed with the failure of the first offensive. If that's the case, the second offensive may be more bark than bite. A New York Times article warns that the situation in Ramadi, near Falluja, is rapidly deteriorating and that guerrillas who are run out of Falluja (population 300,000) might simply move to Ramadi (population 400,000).
The problem whether there is an offensive or not, is the January elections. If there is no offensive placing Falluja under US control, elections will be less meaningful in the Sunni triangle, and a significant Iraqi constituency will be under represented. If there is an offensive, it may turn the hearts and minds of the Sunni Iraqis against the US, again with unfavorable implications for the elections.
All the main news outlets are predicting a new Marine offensive in Falluja soon. This goes back to my earlier posting on September 13, about orders that came from Washington telling the Marines to back off during their first offensive, making them look cowardly. The first offensive started after American security contractors were killed in Falluja and strung up for all to see.
The new offensive seems as politically controlled as the first, which is tough for the Marines who have to carry it out. It seems pretty clear that it is being delayed until too late to influence the US election, or perhaps the threat of the offensive is being used to win the votes of hawks who were disappointed with the failure of the first offensive. If that's the case, the second offensive may be more bark than bite. A New York Times article warns that the situation in Ramadi, near Falluja, is rapidly deteriorating and that guerrillas who are run out of Falluja (population 300,000) might simply move to Ramadi (population 400,000).
The problem whether there is an offensive or not, is the January elections. If there is no offensive placing Falluja under US control, elections will be less meaningful in the Sunni triangle, and a significant Iraqi constituency will be under represented. If there is an offensive, it may turn the hearts and minds of the Sunni Iraqis against the US, again with unfavorable implications for the elections.
Friday, October 29, 2004
Indian Says Bush Was Soft on Non-Proliferation
An article on Rediff.com says that India should support President Bush's re-election because he has been so soft on India's nuclear program. While this attitude may have been good for US-Indian relations, which have needed improvement, it has not been good for the global non-proliferation regime. The problem is that if India proliferates and gets away with it, then every other country will think that it has a right to do so, including Iran and North Korea.
After criticizing Kerry for his strong non-proliferation stand, the article by Colonel Dr Anil A Athale (retd) says, "President Bush on the other hand has been responsible for stalling and virtually killing the CTBT and stressed that he is concerned about the spread of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) to 'terrorist' groups. Bush also stressed his resolve to build the anti-missile defence shield." In other words, Bush opposes some non-proliferation efforts (the CTBT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and has limited other non-proliferation efforts to terrorist groups only (not countries in general). Presumably, he thinks that the anti-missile shield means that the US can live with proliferation.
The writer says, "Thanks to President Bush's pragmatic approach, the issue of Indian nuclear weapons got pushed to the background over the last four years and Indo-US relations flourished."
An article on Rediff.com says that India should support President Bush's re-election because he has been so soft on India's nuclear program. While this attitude may have been good for US-Indian relations, which have needed improvement, it has not been good for the global non-proliferation regime. The problem is that if India proliferates and gets away with it, then every other country will think that it has a right to do so, including Iran and North Korea.
After criticizing Kerry for his strong non-proliferation stand, the article by Colonel Dr Anil A Athale (retd) says, "President Bush on the other hand has been responsible for stalling and virtually killing the CTBT and stressed that he is concerned about the spread of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) to 'terrorist' groups. Bush also stressed his resolve to build the anti-missile defence shield." In other words, Bush opposes some non-proliferation efforts (the CTBT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and has limited other non-proliferation efforts to terrorist groups only (not countries in general). Presumably, he thinks that the anti-missile shield means that the US can live with proliferation.
The writer says, "Thanks to President Bush's pragmatic approach, the issue of Indian nuclear weapons got pushed to the background over the last four years and Indo-US relations flourished."
Why Did the US Ignore the IAEA?
The debate between Bush and Kerry over the missing explosives in al-Qaqaa ignores an important issue: why did the administration ignore the IAEA's designation of these explosives as important to a nuclear weapons program? Bush has said that the main reason for the invasion of Iraq was because Saddam had or was about to get weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear. Remember the mushroom cloud smoking gun?
Under those circumstances, the administration should have requested a list of designated nuclear-related sites from the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and then specifically assigned US troops to check on and secure those sites. The fact that the ABC News video shows US troops breaking an IAEA seal, having no idea what it was, indicates the poor training the troops got for their primary mission of protecting the US and the rest of the world from WMD.
The explosives were not WMD, but they are an important ingredient in making a nuclear weapon go bang, once you have the really important ingredient, fissile uranium or plutonium. Why weren't the troops briefed on this aspect of the invasion, and why was the IAEA's list of nuclear sites ignored? Partly because of the ill will between the Bush administration and the UN, and the UN's IAEA in particular. Bush singled out Hans Blix, who was heading up the UN's inspection effort, for particular personal insults, and apparently the US spied on Blix in the run up to the war. When you burn your bridges, as the US did before the war, you had better be right. It turns out that we were not right.
The debate between Bush and Kerry over the missing explosives in al-Qaqaa ignores an important issue: why did the administration ignore the IAEA's designation of these explosives as important to a nuclear weapons program? Bush has said that the main reason for the invasion of Iraq was because Saddam had or was about to get weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear. Remember the mushroom cloud smoking gun?
Under those circumstances, the administration should have requested a list of designated nuclear-related sites from the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and then specifically assigned US troops to check on and secure those sites. The fact that the ABC News video shows US troops breaking an IAEA seal, having no idea what it was, indicates the poor training the troops got for their primary mission of protecting the US and the rest of the world from WMD.
The explosives were not WMD, but they are an important ingredient in making a nuclear weapon go bang, once you have the really important ingredient, fissile uranium or plutonium. Why weren't the troops briefed on this aspect of the invasion, and why was the IAEA's list of nuclear sites ignored? Partly because of the ill will between the Bush administration and the UN, and the UN's IAEA in particular. Bush singled out Hans Blix, who was heading up the UN's inspection effort, for particular personal insults, and apparently the US spied on Blix in the run up to the war. When you burn your bridges, as the US did before the war, you had better be right. It turns out that we were not right.
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