The New York Times weighs in with an article pointing out a danger that has concerned me for some time: Our policy on elections in Iraq is likely to strengthen the Shiites there and their ties to Iran.
According to a National Geographic Desk Reference, the majority of Muslims are Sunnis. It says that 84 percent of Muslims are Sunni, but 90 percent of Iranians are Shiite, and 60 to 65 percent of Iraqis are Shiite. Since the bulk of the Shiites live in Iran and Iraq, it would seem only natural that if the Shiites do well in the Iraq elections, they will form a alliance of some kind with the Shiites in Iran. But because the Sunnis ruled Iraq under Saddam, and because they seem to form a major part of the current insurgency, we are throwing our lot in with the Shiites in Iraq, while we roundly condemn the Shiites who rule Iran. Our elections may have the perverse result of creating an Iraq that is even more opposed to US interests than it was under Saddam, and perhaps will be a greater danger. Don't forget that Iran may actually be developing nuclear weapons, whereas Iraq under Saddam was only pretending to be developing them in recent years.
Monday, December 20, 2004
Brazil Accused of Nuclear Weapons Ambitions
InfoBrazil has published an article raising questions about whether Brazil might be developing some sort of nuclear weapon, based on its refusal to let the IAEA look at the centrifuges used to enrich uranium in Brazil. This is a touchy issue, because it is Iran's centrifuge program that has created the most controversial problems for its nuclear program.
One important difference is that Brazil probably does not pose a nuclear threat to anyone, even if it develops nuclear weapons, unlike Iran, which poses a threat to Israel, Iraq, and perhaps a few other neighbors. In the old days, when I served in Brazil dealing with the nuclear issue in the American embassy there, Argentina was a nuclear rival with Brazil. Argentina took the lead in defusing this rivalry. Nevertheless, if Brazil developed a bomb, Argentina might feel pressed to develop one, too.
Another important difference is the way safeguards imposed by the IAEA are handled in Brazil and Iran. It appears that Brazil has been much more forthcoming with the IAEA, only imposing the restriction that IAEA inspectors cannot look at the centrifuges. The IAEA can monitor what goes into and comes out of the centrifuges, thus assuring that no uranium is being "highly" enriched. Iran, on the other hand, has been much less cooperative, and the IAEA has had to be much more insistent to find out where the centrifuges are, and then to find out what they are doing.
One important difference is that Brazil probably does not pose a nuclear threat to anyone, even if it develops nuclear weapons, unlike Iran, which poses a threat to Israel, Iraq, and perhaps a few other neighbors. In the old days, when I served in Brazil dealing with the nuclear issue in the American embassy there, Argentina was a nuclear rival with Brazil. Argentina took the lead in defusing this rivalry. Nevertheless, if Brazil developed a bomb, Argentina might feel pressed to develop one, too.
Another important difference is the way safeguards imposed by the IAEA are handled in Brazil and Iran. It appears that Brazil has been much more forthcoming with the IAEA, only imposing the restriction that IAEA inspectors cannot look at the centrifuges. The IAEA can monitor what goes into and comes out of the centrifuges, thus assuring that no uranium is being "highly" enriched. Iran, on the other hand, has been much less cooperative, and the IAEA has had to be much more insistent to find out where the centrifuges are, and then to find out what they are doing.
Letter to Editor in Denver Post
The Denver Post published a letter to the editor about the India non-proliferation issue.
Thursday, December 16, 2004
DU Prof Downplays Indian Proliferation
University of Denver Professor Ved Nanda said in the Denver Post that India was pleased with George Bush's re-election, in part because Bush "is not seen as ideologically stuck on a non-proliferation agenda and, hence, India's nuclear status is likely to gain acceptance without its formally signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty." Later he said, "India has found U.S. cooperation in high technology, nuclear energy, space exploration and missile defense to be very positive steps."
Although our ignoring the fact that India became a nuclear power, despite the U.S. best efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear proliferation, is good for bilateral U.S.-India relations, it is not good for the worldwide non-proliferation regime. Other countries, Iran and North Korea in particular, will see India's flouting of the non-proliferation regime as evidence that they can do it, too. Already people are saying that the lesson of Iraq (which failed) and India (which succeeded) is that you have to build your atomic bomb before you challenge the U.S., and that this is what North Korea and Iran may be doing.
There are efforts to strengthen and reform the NPT and the IAEA, in particular to get rid of IAEA chief Mohammed ElBaradei. But these efforts ignore the fact that the NPT and similar treaties require the offending country to join voluntarily. If these countries perceive that the NPT or its successor is entirely one-sided, that it only requires sacrifices by non-nuclear countries and none by nuclear countries, like the U.S., then they will not join. The NPT requires the nuclear countries to negotiate disarmament, but there have been no serious, binding disarmament talks among the nuclear powers for years.
By removing any international opprobrium for going nuclear, and by making nuclear weapons a sign of great power status, the Bush Administration, Ved Nanda and other pro-Indian writers may be clearing the way for Iran, North Korea, and some other countries (Brazil or South Korea, for starters) to become nuclear powers in the near or mid-term future.
A recent interview, reported by AFP, given in South Korea by Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, in which he urged North and South Korea not to follow India's example by becoming nuclear powers, illustrates how confusing this situation has become. "Natwar's N-speak baffles New Delhi," said a front page headline in Thursday's Indian Express. The Express said Singh "virtually expressed regret over India's current nuclear status" and contradicted the stand taken by former Congress premier Rajiv Gandhi who sanctioned in 1989 pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. The newspaper quoted a senior unnamed Indian foreign ministry official as saying Singh's remarks reflected "his personal view."
A clarification issued about a day later, and reported in NewKerala.com said that the Foreign Minister had said (or meant to say) that the two Koreas should not go nuclear because they had signed the NPT, unlike India. India has refused to sign the NPT because it considers it unfairly discriminatory between countries that had nuclear weapons when the NPT was negotiated, like the U.S., and those that did not, like India, which went nuclear too late to be exempted by the treaty.
Although our ignoring the fact that India became a nuclear power, despite the U.S. best efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear proliferation, is good for bilateral U.S.-India relations, it is not good for the worldwide non-proliferation regime. Other countries, Iran and North Korea in particular, will see India's flouting of the non-proliferation regime as evidence that they can do it, too. Already people are saying that the lesson of Iraq (which failed) and India (which succeeded) is that you have to build your atomic bomb before you challenge the U.S., and that this is what North Korea and Iran may be doing.
There are efforts to strengthen and reform the NPT and the IAEA, in particular to get rid of IAEA chief Mohammed ElBaradei. But these efforts ignore the fact that the NPT and similar treaties require the offending country to join voluntarily. If these countries perceive that the NPT or its successor is entirely one-sided, that it only requires sacrifices by non-nuclear countries and none by nuclear countries, like the U.S., then they will not join. The NPT requires the nuclear countries to negotiate disarmament, but there have been no serious, binding disarmament talks among the nuclear powers for years.
By removing any international opprobrium for going nuclear, and by making nuclear weapons a sign of great power status, the Bush Administration, Ved Nanda and other pro-Indian writers may be clearing the way for Iran, North Korea, and some other countries (Brazil or South Korea, for starters) to become nuclear powers in the near or mid-term future.
A recent interview, reported by AFP, given in South Korea by Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, in which he urged North and South Korea not to follow India's example by becoming nuclear powers, illustrates how confusing this situation has become. "Natwar's N-speak baffles New Delhi," said a front page headline in Thursday's Indian Express. The Express said Singh "virtually expressed regret over India's current nuclear status" and contradicted the stand taken by former Congress premier Rajiv Gandhi who sanctioned in 1989 pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. The newspaper quoted a senior unnamed Indian foreign ministry official as saying Singh's remarks reflected "his personal view."
A clarification issued about a day later, and reported in NewKerala.com said that the Foreign Minister had said (or meant to say) that the two Koreas should not go nuclear because they had signed the NPT, unlike India. India has refused to sign the NPT because it considers it unfairly discriminatory between countries that had nuclear weapons when the NPT was negotiated, like the U.S., and those that did not, like India, which went nuclear too late to be exempted by the treaty.
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