War in Space

When I went as an ACDA officer under Reagan and Ken Adelman to a UN meeting on space law about 25 years ago, our delegation's marching orders were to avoid anything that would restrict or prevent the US from any type of military use of space. According to this article in the Washington Post, nothing much has changed. That was the same job in which I had to write an arms control impact statement on space for the year in which Reagan announced the Star Wars initiative. From what I was allowed to write -- censored drastically by Richard Perle and his minions at the Pentagon -- you would have thought that Star Wars had almost no effect on space arms control.

All Holocaust All the Time 6

I've never understood why it is a good idea to criminalize denial of the Holocaust, although there have been several high visibility trials in Germany. Anyway, France's decision to criminalize denial of Armenian genocide emphasizes the problems with such limitations on speech. This NYT editorial recognizes the free speech problem, but makes an exception for the Holocaust.

North Korean Framework Agreement Was Not Worthless

This op-ed in the NYT explains that the nuclear framework agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration worked to put a cap on North Korea's plutonium production. It was not worthless as the Bush administration claimed. It was less than perfect, but Bush replaced something with nothing.

North Korea Nuclear Test

This article from the New Scientist explains the difficulties in evaluating an underground nuclear test like North Korea's. So far, it seems as if the test was less than completely successful, but if there was any nuclear component to the explosion, it is confirmation that the North Koreans have achieved one of the most difficult elements of the process of building an atomic bomb, separating out the plutonium.

A bomb made of enriched plutonium is easier to build and explode, but the uranium is harder to produce. Plutonium is not easy, because it is made from the highly radioactive waste products of a nuclear reactor. But the reactor and the separation facilities are easier to build than the temperamental centrifuges or very energy intensive processes needed to produce highly enriched uranium.

So, if the North Koreans have produced enough plutonium to use some to test a nuclear explosive device, then they are well along in the process, even if they don't have a deliverable bomb. It is possible that some of the Pakistani nuclear tests were also less than 100% successful.

The fact that North Korea has reached this level, whatever it turns out to be exactly, is a grave indictment of Bush's nuclear non-proliferation policy. The Clinton administration had an agreement in place the capped North Korea's plutonium production capability. When some evidence turned up that North Korea was working on uranium enrichment, we (the US) threw as hissy fit, and abandoned the cap on plutonium. So, now North Korea is close to having a plutonium bomb, although there is no indication that they are making much, if any, progress on a uranium bomb. We threw out the baby with the bathwater, and now we will reap the whirlwind, to mix some metaphors. The incompetent architect of this policy is UN Amb. John Bolton, who was Under Secretary of State for non-proliferation for years before he went to the UN.

This is a failure for which the administration should be pilloried. It was unnecessary and shows gross incompetence. It was brought to you by the same incompetents who brought you the Iraq war. We are less safe, but we didn't need to be. Abandoning the Clinton initiatives has brought us closer to nuclear war in Asia, which could spread to the US. Or, North Korea, which tends to sell anything it has on the black market, may sell nuclear weapons, or perhaps just components to terrorists or to other rogue regimes.