North Korea’s test of a nuclear device has prompted
discussion of its missile program. When
I was at the State Department, I spent years working on the creation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). I am disappointed that I have not seen it mentioned
in connection with North Korea’s development of missiles. Before the North Korean test, the “Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists” published several articles dealing with missile
proliferation and the MTCR: “Missile
proliferation: Treat the disease,” and “Too late for
missile proliferation?” as well as several other articles that were part of
a debate about how to deal with missile proliferation.
The MTCR is basically an export control agreement for
nations capable of supplying missile hardware and technology. By joining the MTCR they agree not to supply
items or knowledge to proliferating countries that could be used to build
nuclear capable missiles. It is not an arms
control agreement that prohibits the proliferation of missile technology. It is more like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
than the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
As proliferating countries become more capable of producing
missiles on their own, the export restrictions of the MTCR have less
effect. The MTCR probably did slow down
North Korea’s development of missiles, but now it is less effective. However, building missiles is “rocket science,”
and there are some very difficult technologies involved. Therefore, the MTCR may still play a role in
limiting or slowing down the ability of North Korea to build more powerful and
more accurate missiles, but at this point, slowing down is about the best it
could do. Press articles seem to agree
that North Korea could build strategic nuclear missiles that could reach the US
by 2020, e.g. a
New York Times article says, “Military experts say that by 2020, Pyongyang
will most likely have the skills to make a reliable intercontinental ballistic
missile topped by a nuclear warhead.” However,
the MTCR might still help restrict the accuracy and the size of the warhead for
such a missile by 2020. It might mean
that North Korea could be able to hit somewhere in the greater Washington
metropolitan area with a bomb the size of the one the US used on Hiroshima,
rather than one that could reliably hit Pennsylvania Avenue and destroy both
the White House and the Capitol, as well as most of the city. Neither of these outcomes is acceptable, but
the greater the chances that a missile might misfire, go off course or fail to
detonate, the better.
Of course it would be better to have in place a strong
treaty that prohibits missile proliferation like the NPT does for bombs, but
that is unlikely. One reason the MTCR is
so weak is that it is all that even the friendliest countries, like the UK,
France, or Japan, would agree to.
Furthermore the NPT has not been successful in limiting nuclear proliferation
by the most threatening countries, such as North Korea. As in most areas of life, laws constrain
decent people, but criminals commit crimes despite the laws against it.
One advantage of the NPT is that it has its own police
force, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has performed its
job well in a number of cases, discovering and reporting prohibited activities
by member parties. However, the IAEA has
no authority in countries that are not parties to the NPT, which includes most
of the worrisome countries, such as North Korea. There are countries that have joined the NPT,
but then have gotten off the track, perhaps after a change of government. This happened in Iran. The IAEA has worked successfully in Iran and
is a key component of the US-Iran deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program.