US Review of Death Penalty Cases Under Vienna Convention
I strongly support the view in today's New York Times editorial that the US comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice calling on the US to review the convictions of foreigners in the US who were denied access to consular officials from their home countries, which is a right granted under the Vienna Convention, to which the US is a signatory. As the editorial points out, the main concern is that US consular officials be granted access to US citizens arrested in foreign countries, who are much more likely to be subjected to torture or lesser mistreatment, than foreigners are in the US. It is a simple matter of protecting Americans. I suppose Bush's solution, given his contempt for law and diplomacy, is to forget the law and instead send in US troops to kill the foreign prison guards and release any Americans who he thinks have been arrested and treated improperly.
Monday, April 19, 2004
Woodward Book
I am glad that Secretary of State Powell appears to be getting his view out in Bob Woodward's new book, although the book is apparently not released, yet. Powell is probably worried about his place in history, since he has spent his career at State surrounded by a bunch of uneducated idiots in other parts of the government, i.e., Bush and Cheney. Rumsfeld and Rice are not idiots, but they have not used their minds in their current positions. According to Woodward on "60 Minutes" last night, President Bush is totally uninterested in his place in history. He told Woodward, "History, we don't know. We'll all be dead." Bush probably never read a history book anyway.
I am glad that Secretary of State Powell appears to be getting his view out in Bob Woodward's new book, although the book is apparently not released, yet. Powell is probably worried about his place in history, since he has spent his career at State surrounded by a bunch of uneducated idiots in other parts of the government, i.e., Bush and Cheney. Rumsfeld and Rice are not idiots, but they have not used their minds in their current positions. According to Woodward on "60 Minutes" last night, President Bush is totally uninterested in his place in history. He told Woodward, "History, we don't know. We'll all be dead." Bush probably never read a history book anyway.
Tuesday, April 06, 2004
Casey at the CIA
In chapter 2 of Dick Clarke's Against All Enemies, he describes Bill Casey's role at CIA in supplying Stinger missiles to the Afghan resistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But it reminded me of my tour in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) before Clarke was there. I worked on National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-12-80 "Prospects for Soviet Military Technology and R&D" which has since been almost entirely declassified. I was concerned that this NIE tended to make the Soviets look too powerful, and was not an accurate depiction of their military technology and R&D. I was surprised to find that then Secretary of State George Shultz shared that opinion of the intelligence produced by Casey's CIA. What was happening then was not unlike what happened with the CIA's intelligence on Iraq prior to the Iraq war, but Shultz was aware of it and took account of it better than his successors did.
In his memoir, Turmoil and Triumph, Secretary Shultz wrote that he was displeased by the way that Casey cooked intelligence to reflect his personal views. Shultz wrote:
I was also increasingly uneasy about CIA director Bill Casey. He had very strong policy positions, which were reflected in his intelligence briefings. He claimed he was objective. But his views were so strong and so ideological that they inevitably colored his selection and assessment of materials. I could not rely on what he said, nor could I accept without question the objectivity of the “intelligence” that he put out, especially in policy-sensitive areas. (p. 691)
In chapter 2 of Dick Clarke's Against All Enemies, he describes Bill Casey's role at CIA in supplying Stinger missiles to the Afghan resistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But it reminded me of my tour in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) before Clarke was there. I worked on National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-12-80 "Prospects for Soviet Military Technology and R&D" which has since been almost entirely declassified. I was concerned that this NIE tended to make the Soviets look too powerful, and was not an accurate depiction of their military technology and R&D. I was surprised to find that then Secretary of State George Shultz shared that opinion of the intelligence produced by Casey's CIA. What was happening then was not unlike what happened with the CIA's intelligence on Iraq prior to the Iraq war, but Shultz was aware of it and took account of it better than his successors did.
In his memoir, Turmoil and Triumph, Secretary Shultz wrote that he was displeased by the way that Casey cooked intelligence to reflect his personal views. Shultz wrote:
I was also increasingly uneasy about CIA director Bill Casey. He had very strong policy positions, which were reflected in his intelligence briefings. He claimed he was objective. But his views were so strong and so ideological that they inevitably colored his selection and assessment of materials. I could not rely on what he said, nor could I accept without question the objectivity of the “intelligence” that he put out, especially in policy-sensitive areas. (p. 691)
Battleship New Jersey
In Chapter 2 of Against All Enemies, Dick Clarke writes about the battleship New Jersey firing "shells as big as Volkswagens" from off the coast of Lebanon to protect the American Embassy in Beirut. I remember shooting with the New Jersey in Vietnam. My heavy artillery battery was stationed with the 101st Airborne at LZ Sally near the coast, south of Quang Tri. The 101st got into a big firefight not far to the north, and since the New Jersey was in the area, someone invited them to join us in shelling the North Vietnamese in this firefight. When we would talk on our little radios to the infantry in the field or to our artillery battalion headquarters, the signal would be weak and full of static. When we talked to the New Jersey, it was like listening to a powerful, clear FM station back in the States. We could see the firefight clearly; the sky to the north was full of tracers. However, after we fired our guns, we all ran out to see the New Jersey's shells land. When you fire near friendly troops, you always give "Splash" over the radio about 5 seconds before the shells land, so that our troops know to duck. The New Jersey gave "Splash," but we never saw or heard any shells land a few seconds afterwards. I've always wondered where those shells went.
In Chapter 2 of Against All Enemies, Dick Clarke writes about the battleship New Jersey firing "shells as big as Volkswagens" from off the coast of Lebanon to protect the American Embassy in Beirut. I remember shooting with the New Jersey in Vietnam. My heavy artillery battery was stationed with the 101st Airborne at LZ Sally near the coast, south of Quang Tri. The 101st got into a big firefight not far to the north, and since the New Jersey was in the area, someone invited them to join us in shelling the North Vietnamese in this firefight. When we would talk on our little radios to the infantry in the field or to our artillery battalion headquarters, the signal would be weak and full of static. When we talked to the New Jersey, it was like listening to a powerful, clear FM station back in the States. We could see the firefight clearly; the sky to the north was full of tracers. However, after we fired our guns, we all ran out to see the New Jersey's shells land. When you fire near friendly troops, you always give "Splash" over the radio about 5 seconds before the shells land, so that our troops know to duck. The New Jersey gave "Splash," but we never saw or heard any shells land a few seconds afterwards. I've always wondered where those shells went.
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