Casey at the CIA
In chapter 2 of Dick Clarke's Against All Enemies, he describes Bill Casey's role at CIA in supplying Stinger missiles to the Afghan resistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But it reminded me of my tour in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) before Clarke was there. I worked on National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-12-80 "Prospects for Soviet Military Technology and R&D" which has since been almost entirely declassified. I was concerned that this NIE tended to make the Soviets look too powerful, and was not an accurate depiction of their military technology and R&D. I was surprised to find that then Secretary of State George Shultz shared that opinion of the intelligence produced by Casey's CIA. What was happening then was not unlike what happened with the CIA's intelligence on Iraq prior to the Iraq war, but Shultz was aware of it and took account of it better than his successors did.
In his memoir, Turmoil and Triumph, Secretary Shultz wrote that he was displeased by the way that Casey cooked intelligence to reflect his personal views. Shultz wrote:
I was also increasingly uneasy about CIA director Bill Casey. He had very strong policy positions, which were reflected in his intelligence briefings. He claimed he was objective. But his views were so strong and so ideological that they inevitably colored his selection and assessment of materials. I could not rely on what he said, nor could I accept without question the objectivity of the “intelligence” that he put out, especially in policy-sensitive areas. (p. 691)
Tuesday, April 06, 2004
Battleship New Jersey
In Chapter 2 of Against All Enemies, Dick Clarke writes about the battleship New Jersey firing "shells as big as Volkswagens" from off the coast of Lebanon to protect the American Embassy in Beirut. I remember shooting with the New Jersey in Vietnam. My heavy artillery battery was stationed with the 101st Airborne at LZ Sally near the coast, south of Quang Tri. The 101st got into a big firefight not far to the north, and since the New Jersey was in the area, someone invited them to join us in shelling the North Vietnamese in this firefight. When we would talk on our little radios to the infantry in the field or to our artillery battalion headquarters, the signal would be weak and full of static. When we talked to the New Jersey, it was like listening to a powerful, clear FM station back in the States. We could see the firefight clearly; the sky to the north was full of tracers. However, after we fired our guns, we all ran out to see the New Jersey's shells land. When you fire near friendly troops, you always give "Splash" over the radio about 5 seconds before the shells land, so that our troops know to duck. The New Jersey gave "Splash," but we never saw or heard any shells land a few seconds afterwards. I've always wondered where those shells went.
In Chapter 2 of Against All Enemies, Dick Clarke writes about the battleship New Jersey firing "shells as big as Volkswagens" from off the coast of Lebanon to protect the American Embassy in Beirut. I remember shooting with the New Jersey in Vietnam. My heavy artillery battery was stationed with the 101st Airborne at LZ Sally near the coast, south of Quang Tri. The 101st got into a big firefight not far to the north, and since the New Jersey was in the area, someone invited them to join us in shelling the North Vietnamese in this firefight. When we would talk on our little radios to the infantry in the field or to our artillery battalion headquarters, the signal would be weak and full of static. When we talked to the New Jersey, it was like listening to a powerful, clear FM station back in the States. We could see the firefight clearly; the sky to the north was full of tracers. However, after we fired our guns, we all ran out to see the New Jersey's shells land. When you fire near friendly troops, you always give "Splash" over the radio about 5 seconds before the shells land, so that our troops know to duck. The New Jersey gave "Splash," but we never saw or heard any shells land a few seconds afterwards. I've always wondered where those shells went.
Diego Garcia
In chapter 2 of Dick Clarke's book Against All Enemies, he writes about President Reagan's decision to get involved in the Middle East, which included setting up an American base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. One of the classic State Department telegrams I remember was a reply to a worried inquiry sent to a number of American embassies about how their governments would respond to our setting up such a base. One embassy replied, "Our government thinks Diego Garcia is a cigar."
In chapter 2 of Dick Clarke's book Against All Enemies, he writes about President Reagan's decision to get involved in the Middle East, which included setting up an American base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. One of the classic State Department telegrams I remember was a reply to a worried inquiry sent to a number of American embassies about how their governments would respond to our setting up such a base. One embassy replied, "Our government thinks Diego Garcia is a cigar."
Saturday, April 03, 2004
Powell Admits Iraq Intelligence Flawed
I am pleased that Secretary of State Powell has admitted that the US intelligence on Iraq that he presented to the UN a year ago was flawed. According to reports, he singled out the intelligence on mobile chemical weapons laboratories as some of the most misleading, apparently because the CIA told him that it had several sources for that information, but it did not. I doubt that Powell would have made such a statement if others in the administration, such as Richard Clarke and David Kay, had not begun to break through the cone of silence on the issue. Powell is a team player, as he demonstrated in the run-up to the war on Iraq. The administration paraded him at the UN for a presentation that has ended up making him look foolish and unprofessional, a stark contrast to Adlai Stevenson's presentation during the Cuban missile crisis. However, I think Powell, although he was wronged by this episode, would have stayed quiet, if others had not started screaming their heads off about it. I imagine that Powell is just biding his time until he can leave this administration gracefully, having had his fill of seeing the President do the bidding of wild men like Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, his deputy Wolfowitz, and Vice President Cheney, while Powell recommended a more prudent course of action that the President rejected.
I am pleased that Secretary of State Powell has admitted that the US intelligence on Iraq that he presented to the UN a year ago was flawed. According to reports, he singled out the intelligence on mobile chemical weapons laboratories as some of the most misleading, apparently because the CIA told him that it had several sources for that information, but it did not. I doubt that Powell would have made such a statement if others in the administration, such as Richard Clarke and David Kay, had not begun to break through the cone of silence on the issue. Powell is a team player, as he demonstrated in the run-up to the war on Iraq. The administration paraded him at the UN for a presentation that has ended up making him look foolish and unprofessional, a stark contrast to Adlai Stevenson's presentation during the Cuban missile crisis. However, I think Powell, although he was wronged by this episode, would have stayed quiet, if others had not started screaming their heads off about it. I imagine that Powell is just biding his time until he can leave this administration gracefully, having had his fill of seeing the President do the bidding of wild men like Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, his deputy Wolfowitz, and Vice President Cheney, while Powell recommended a more prudent course of action that the President rejected.
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