My Anti-Bush is Nader

The Democrats think their call for anybody but Bush means voting for Kerry. But for me it means voting for Nader. I don't like Bush, but I don't like Kerry either. Why I don't like Bush should be pretty clear from other postings on this blog.

There are two main reasons that I don't like Kerry. As a Vietnam veteran, I didn't like his accusations that all Vietnam vets are war criminals, although his campaign says that he didn't believe this, that he was just reporting what other people said at some Detroit anti-war conference. I don't buy it. He may not have believed it, but he was using those accusations, which were well received by the left in those days to advance his career. It obviously worked; he's the Democrats' candidate for President.

The second reason I don't like Kerry is his position on the Middle East. The main reason for the unrest in the Middle East is Israel, and America's unquestioning support for Ariel Sharon. George Bush's obsequious, puppy-like devotion to Sharon's every whim is embarrassing to the United States. The latest is Dov Weisglass' statement that Sharon's Gaza policy is intended to freeze the peace process, and Bush's cowardly acceptance of it. Unfortunately, Kerry's position on Israel, as on Iraq, is almost identical to Bush's. In Israel, it appears that there is some lively debate about Sharon's hard line policy. In America, the Jewish community is solidly behind Sharon, which apparently means that both major political parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, unquestioningly support his bloodly, oppressive policies. Senator Edward's answer to Gwin Ifill's question on Israel during the Vice Presidential debate showed how devoted they are to Israel regardless of Israel's persecution of the Palestinians.

So, Nader is my man.

Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, Me, and the Bomb

On October 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Brazilian Minister Celso Amorim while Powell was visiting Brazil. When I was assigned to the US Embassy in Brasilia as science officer during the 1980s, Celso Amorim was serving as the Foreign Ministry representative in the Ministry of Science and Technology. According to his bio, he held this job from 1985-88.

The US wanted to have a big meeting in Brazil to discuss scientific and technological cooperation, with the US side led by President Bush I's science adviser, Allan Bromley of Yale. Celso Amorim was not a big fan of the US, was not enthusiastic about the meeting, and stonewalled for a long time. Eventually we held the meeting, but there was not much agreement on joint projects. There was a lot of hand waving and agreements to agree later on specific projects.

During Powell's visit, there was discussion of Brazil's cooperation with IAEA inspectors who are scheduled to come to Brazil. There has been a question whether they would be allowed to inspect Brazil's plant for making uranium fuel for its nuclear power reactors. Brazil bought a huge nuclear fuel cycle plant from Germany before I was there in the 1980s. Then there was concern that Brazil would use it to highly enrich uranium to a level useful for bombs. That uranium enrichment process was very inefficient and cumbersome. Recently there have been rumors that Brazil purchased a more efficient centrifuge enrichment system from A.Q. Khan and Pakistanis, and for that reason would restrict the IAEA inspection.

When asked about the nuclear issue, Powell said, "I don’t think Brazil could be talked about in the same vein or put in the same category as Iran or North Korea.... In the case of Iran, Iran has been not forthcoming with respect to what it has been doing and we have seen the IAEA prying information out of Iran and our judgment is that Iran’s program is not just for power, but is also designed to move in the direction of a nuclear weapon. In the case of Brazil, this is simply not the case."

Following Secretary Powell's remarks, Celso Amorim said, "I won't go into the technical details, because I have no expertise to do that. But, it’s a simple matter. Brazil has nothing to hide in terms of its uranium enrichment process except for the technology that Brazil has acquired, and which Brazil naturally wishes to protect. It's perfectly possible, and this has been discussed very productively in Vienna. I, myself, was on the telephone with the director of the Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. El Baradei, who was very pleased with the contacts that he had made with our technical people. And, therefore, I believe it is perfectly possible to conciliate the objectives of the Atomic Energy Agency, to give them the certainty that the entire enrichment process is only for peaceful purposes, that there is no deviation of uranium, while at the same time protecting the Brazilian technology.

"Specifically how that's to be done has to be discussed between the Agency's technical people and the Brazilian authorities in the sector, specifically at the Resende plant that will be visited. It is in our interest to solve this problem, because we want to put the Resende plant into operation, as we have economic needs. Brazil is such a huge country, we cannot do without any source of energy. Brazil has major uranium reserves, and it's only natural that we do not want to have to send our uranium abroad to be enriched, to then have to have to come back to Brazil. That just doesn't make sense....

"Now, in terms of the Additional Protocol, I'll repeat one thing that I've said many times: Brazil has never said that it would not sign, but there is a process of negotiation here I think that we will soon come to an agreement on the Resende plant. And that will help consolidate the subject for the future. But, I want to reiterate, as I said to Secretary Powell, that when Brazil adhered to the Nonproliferation Treaty we actually accepted the package deal. There are three basic elements there: nonproliferation, as such; the possibility of peaceful use of nuclear power with no restrictions, unless there is some specific suspicion on the country but now Secretary Powell has said that there is none; and, third, concrete steps towards disarmament. Within that spirit we will continue to work on these matters. And, I'm certain that as in all the other situations, Brazil has always shown its desire to cooperate with the global goals of nonproliferation and of disarmament, and will continue to work in that direction."

The Additional Protocol which Amorim mentioned gives the IAEA stronger authority for inspections than originally granted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Brazil did not join the NPT for years because it said that the NPT was discriminatory, giving more rights to nuclear powers like the US than to non-nuclear countries. When it finally joined, it did not agree to the additional protocol, and now will probably argue that the international community is trying to change the terms of the agreement after it has been signed. This happened to Brazil when it bought its first nuclear power reactor from Westinghouse in the US in the 1970s. After the billion dollar deal was signed, Congress passed a law saying that the US could not supply fuel for the reactor unless Brazil agreed to "full scope safeguards" (more intrusive than those Brazil had already agreed to) under the NPT. Brazil did not agree then and turned to Germany for future reactors and nuclear technology. Brazil bristled when the US refused to supply the fuel that it had agreed to supply, which was especially harmful coming on the heels of the OPEC embargo that had cut off Brazil's petroleum supply.

Part of my job in Brazil during the 1980s was to get Brazil to be more forthcoming on the nuclear safeguards issue. I was not very successful until the President of Argentina invited the President of Brazil to visit Bariloche, known to be the location of the primary Argentine nuclear research center. Removing an element of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear competition helped both countries move toward more responsible nuclear programs. But Brazil has always been nationalistic. It still did not join the NPT until years later. If the world allows India and Pakistan (not to mention Israel, North Korea, and perhaps some other countries) to join the nuclear club, then Brazil may well insist that it also has the right to join. I don't think there is any indication that Brazil would want nuclear weapons to threaten anybody, but it would not easily consign itself to second-class status in the world by giving up the nuclear option, if nuclear weapons are seen as a sign of great power status.

Charlie Duelfer and Me

Just for the record, Charlie Duelfer, who just issued his report on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and I served together in the State Department's old Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs during the Bush I administration under then-Assistant Secretary of State Richard Clarke (of Against All Enemies fame). I was working on the Missile Technology Control Regime and other missile proliferation issues, and I forget what Charlie was working on, but I think it had to do with technology transfer issues, and so we talked when there were problems with missile-related technology transfers.

More Unrest in Pakistan

A bomb attack in Pakistan today that killed almost 40 Sunnis is evidence of the continuing unrest there. The Sunnis then went on a rampage against the Shiites, which prompted the government to ban all such gatherings. Is this a country that can adequately care for its atomic bombs?

Brits First to Connect Bin Laden to Pakistani Nuclear Help

According to Bob Woodward's Plan of Attack, in late November 2001, Britain's CIA, MI6, found that a Pakistani nuclear weapons designer was willing to sell a nuclear bomb design to a British undercover agent posing as a terrorist. He offered information on a dirty bomb as well as on a relatively sophisticated nuclear bomb. Woodward says that CIA agents found a diagram of a dirty bomb when they overran a bin Laden sanctuary in Afghanistan. As a result, Woodward says that Bush sent then-CIA Director Tenet to peel "back the eyeballs of" Pakistani General Musharraf. The CIA asked the Washington Post to sit on a story about the Pakistani connection because it might cause the Pakistanis to stop cooperating. Woodward concludes, "Four months later, the senior CIA official said the agency 'didn't find what we feared in Afghanistan, but is it somewhere else? I don't think we're to the bottom of this yet.'"

In a footnote, Woodward says, "This was the beginning of the operation that in 2004 uncovered the clandestine sale of nuclear technology by the head of Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who later confessed to aiding Iran, North Korea and Libya." I'm not sure that this was the operation that led to exposing the A.Q. Khan network, although it may have contributed important information which allowed intelligence analysts to figure out what was going on when Libya turned its nuclear program over to the West. I think Libya's move was what exposed A.Q. Khan, and that Libya was motivated by its desire to settle the PanAm 103 incident and return to the West's good graces.

Was Kerry Wrong to Criticize Allawi?

In the vice-presidential debate, Cheney jumped on Edwards for Kerry's criticism of Allawi after his address to Congress. Kerry criticized him because Allawi was campaigning for the Republicans. The Repubicans, not Kerry, started the debasement of the Iraqi government by using it as a Republican campaign tool. A number of comparisons on TV showed the similarity between Allawi's speech and his subsequent remarks, and Bush's stump speeches on Iraq. The Washington Post reported that the Bush administration and the Bush campaign had been involved in writing Allawi's speech. Since Allawi was campaigning for Bush, it was abolutely appropriate for Kerry to criticize him. The Republicans bought and paid for Allawi, and thus they can make him jump whenever they pull his strings. The Americans are still running Iraq (at least the parts not in open rebellion). It's not like he is the head of a real government.

Iran Claims More Powerful Missile

While the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is meeting in Seoul on how to control missile proliferation, Iran has announced that it has a missile with a range of 2,000 km, or about 1,250 miles. CNN does not say how heavy a payload it can carry to this range, which could be important in deciding whether it could carry a nuclear warhead that far. In any case, the report indicates that the new missile is almost twice as powerful as Iran's previously most powerful missile, the Shahab-3. The new missile would be capable of reaching Israel and parts of southeastern Europe.

US Vetoes UN Resolution Criticizing Israel

Reuters reported that the United States on Tuesday vetoed a UN Security Council resolution demanding that Israel stop its major offensive in the Gaza Strip that has cost at least 68 Palestinian lives. Eleven nations voted in favor. Britain, Germany and Romania abstained on the measure, which was drafted by Arab nations.

Blindly supporting Israel's offensive against the Palestinians is not going to help us in Iraq, or anywhere else, except in Israel and with some constituencies in the US. Bush had it backwards; the road to peace in Baghdad runs through Jerusalem. We are only asking for more Arab and Muslim hatred.

Bush Is a Liar, Or Something Is Rotten in the White House, Say Dean and the NYT

Howard Dean pulled a few punches on Letterman last night, but he still spoke more clearly and honestly than anybody else, including Kerry. He spoke at length about the Sunday New York Times article on the aluminum tubes that Bush and his subordinates (Cheney, Rice, Powell) said were for centrifuges for nuclear purposes, but that the intelligence community knew were for conventional weapons uses.

Today the NYT followed up its article with an editorial saying that the administration had plenty of evidence that the tubes-for-bombs theory was baseless. The editorial says that Colin Powell "gravely damaged his reputation" by using the faulty information in his UN briefing, and that either Condi Rice fell down badly in keeping the President informed about this issue and should resign, or the President "terribly misled the public."

MTCR Meeting in Seoul

A meeting of the members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which I helped create while I was working at the State Department, is being held in Seoul, South Korea. I'm glad it's still around and hopefully doing some good.

New York Times Studies Iraqi Aluminum Cylinders

A huge article in today's New York Times, "How the White House Used Disputed Arms Intelligence," describes at length how the Bush administration used questionable analysis of intelligence to support its plan to invade Iraq. The White House knew that there was disagreement within the Intelligence Community about what Iraq intended to do with the aluminum tubes, but chose to ignore the disagreement and use only the interpretation that the tubes were intended to be used only in centrifuges for uranium enrichment. According to the article, this administration interpretation was mainly supported only by one junior analyst at CIA, and was opposed by analysts at the Department of Energy who had the most expertise on the subject.

The article is a strong indictment of the current intelligence structure, because George Tenet, the then-Director of Central Intelligence, claimed that he had no role in settling this dispute between intelligence organizations, despite the fact that this dispute was intimately related to the US decision to go to war with Iraq.

In addition, experts at the IAEA (the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency) also strongly discounted the CIA interpretation. According to the article, when the CIA analyst championing the nuclear use went to Vienna to make his presentation to the IAEA, the presentation was a disaster.

Is Pakistan's Nuclear Threat Manageable?

In the October Atlantic Monthly magazine, Graham Allison argues that while Pakistan is perhaps the greatest threat to American security today, it can be defused. Allison says that he was more frightened by the reports of A.Q. Khan's nuclear supplier network than he has been since the Cuban Missile Crisis. He says that once Khan's activities were discovered -- "a 'Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation' -- a decades-old illicit market in nuclear materials, designs, technologies, and consulting services, all run out of Pakistan," the Pakistani response was to grant Khan a pardon. Allison continues, "Pakistani investigators have reportedly questioned a grand total of eleven people from among the country's 6,000 nuclear scientists and 45,000 nuclear workers, and have refused to allow either the United States or the IAEA access to Khan for questioning."

Allison says that in August 2001, Osama bin Laden met with two former officials of Pakistan's atomic energy program, where bin Laden and his second-in-command Zawahiri grilled them about how to make weapons of mass destruction. Then Allison raises the issue that has most alarmed me, "that a coup might topple Musharraf and leave all or some of Pakistan's nuclear weapons under the control of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or some other militant Islamic group (or, indeed, under the control of more than one)."

Allison proposes that Pakistan generally follow the model of the Soviet Union as it was disintegrating; the USSR pulled most of its nuclear weapons back from states that were on the verge of becoming independent, leaving them only in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, from which they were removed later. Another move would be for the US to help Pakistan install "permissive action links" (PALs) on all nuclear weapons, requiring Musharraf's personal approval before a nuclear weapon could be used. Allison argues that Pakistan would be unlikely to tell the US where all of its nuclear weapons are, but it might tell the US about some and China about the remaining ones.

Pakistan is unlikely to agree to either course of action proposed by Allison. As he says, Pakistan's main nuclear rival is India, and while peace talks between the two are ongoing, they will have to get a lot better, as will the situation in Kashmir, before Musharraf can be perceived by the Pakistani population as caving to international pressure to impose stricter controls on Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

As I noted earlier, it's unlikely that anything will happen on this front until there are some serious arms control negotiations among all the powers possessing nuclear weapons, including the US and Israel. One of the underlying assumptions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is that the old nuclear powers, the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, etc., would engage in serious disarmament negotiations, which has not happened. Bush has shown contempt for such negotiations, and further undermined the concept by withdrawing from the ABM treaty. If anything, the Bush administration's conduct has shown how important it believes the possession of nuclear weapons is in order to be a superpower. Other countries are likely to follow the US example and ignore disarmament as an option.

What About Abu Ghraib?

I was disappointed that neither Kerry nor Bush mentioned Abu Ghraib in the debate last night. While no clear paper trail of orders has been traced to senior administration officials, the fact that the Bush administration decided from the creation the Guantanamo prison not to apply the Geneva Convention implicates the very highest levels of the administration in the Abu Ghraib atrocities. I find the failure to honor the Geneva Convention so offensive that it sullies the reputation of everyone in the Bush administration. The lower ranking soldiers who are being court martialed for their role in Abu Ghraib should have known better, but the administration that created the atmosphere of acceptance of torture is certainly to blame as well. It's possible that in a few years, Bush, Rumsfeld, maybe even Powell, and some of their subordinates will be branded as war criminals, and they, like Pinochet in Chile, will be unable to travel outside of the US without fear of being arrested.

US Deploys Anti-Satellite Weapon

The Rocky Mountain News reported today that Air Force Brigadier General Larry James announced that Air Force Space Command has deployed a new weapon to attack enemy satellite communications at the 76th Space Control Squadron in Colorado Springs. James did not say how the anti-satellite weapon works, whether it destroys the offending satellite or just interferes with it. Depending on how it works, it could create questions about space arms control, which probably don't interest the Bush administration, or if arms control is out of the question, could trigger some sort of arms race in space, particularly with the Russians, but perhaps also with the Chinese.

Cyber Security Chief Abruptly Resigns

The abrupt resignation of Amit Yoran, Richard Clarke's replacement (once removed) as cyber security chief in the Homeland Security Department, indicates that all is not well in Homeland Security. This tends to support Kerry's contention that Bush has focused too exclusively on Iraq and ignored other, more pressing threats to the US.

This abrupt resignation tends to reinforce the impression that Tom Ridge has been a failure as Homeland Security Secretary. His main activities seem to have been changing the color of the alert level, and recommending that people buy duct tape, while cargo security at ports and airports largely remains at pre-9/11 levels. Could Homeland Security find one of those atomic bombs that A.Q. Khan may have helped Osama bin Laden build?

Does Bush Think Pakistan's A.Q. Khan Has Been Brought to Justice?

Last night in his first debate with Senator Kerry, President Bush said, "The A.Q. Khan network has been brought to justice." He later said, "We busted the A.Q. Khan network. This was a proliferator out of Pakistan that was selling secrets to places like North Korea and Libya." They (various people and organizations -- the US, the British, the IAEA) did catch A.Q. Khan mainly because they stumbled over his activities in Libya when Libya renounced its WMD activities. Did Libya renounce its WMD because of US pressure. We'll probably never know exactly what motivated Qadhafi, but it's likely that he was motivated more by trying to settle Lockerbie-PanAm bombing under pressure from the British than because of any American breakthroughs.

So, what about A.Q. Khan? After the debate, CNN's Wolf Blitzer asked Karen Hughes about Bush's statement. He asked, "Do you believe that A.Q. Khan, who delivered nuclear materials to North Korea, to Libya, to other countries, has been a brought to justice?" Karen Hughes replied, "Wolf, his ability to trade on the black market nuclear materials has been severely damaged and compromised, yes." Wolf followed up, "But I get back to A.Q. Khan. He's a free man in Pakistan, he was pardoned by President Musharraf. Does that mean he has been brought to justice, after all that he did in circulating banned nuclear equipment around the world?" Karen Hughes replied "Well, again, Wolf, what I can tell you about A.Q. Khan is that his ability -- the president has made anti-proliferation a centerpiece of his initiative. The A.Q. Khan network's ability to deliver and trade in nuclear materials on the black market has been shattered."

So, A.Q. Khan is not selling nuclear materials at the moment, but he's walking around a free man, with millions of dollars in the bank from his past activities. And, we don't know exactly what he was doing before we stumbled on his operation, because Pakistan's president won't let US agents talk to him, and Bush won't pressure Musharraf to let them. Did Khan help Al-Qaida with nuclear weapons? We don't know.

Pakistan Stiffs the IAEA

According to a recent AFP report of a BBC interview, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said that Pakistan has refused to let the UN atomic watchdog IAEA interview disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, ringleader of the Pakistani nuclear smuggling network. The AFP report continued, "Asked why Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf reportedly said that nobody had asked to question Khan, ElBaradei said: 'I can tell my Pakistani friends that I will be happy to send a team tomorrow to talk to him if we can, absolutely.'"

If there was any doubt that Bush's friend Musharraf was stonewalling about what A.Q. Khan was up to before he was caught providing nuclear assistance to Libya, this comment by ElBaradei should eliminate it. The big question, of course, is whether he was talking to terrorists like Osama bin Laden. And, if so, what sort of help did he provide them. This could be of greater importance than the help we know he provided to Iran and North Korea.

Are Pakistan and Russia Dependable American Friends?

Pakistan's leader, General Musharraf, is Bush's good friend, as Vladimir Putin is in Russia, but maybe the rest of us should look at this friendship a little more closely. Neither Musharraf nor Putin seems to be leading his country toward greater democracy, and both countries are among the most likely to increase nuclear proliferation. Musharraf recently hinted that he may not step down as military commander while he keeps his job as president. Putin has imposed a number of undemocratic changes following the massacre of children in Beslan by Chechen terrorists.

Pakistan has nuclear weapons; it has tested them for all the world to see. Pakistan also has Islamic terrorists in close proximity to its atomic bombs; the American commander in Afghanistan just said that Osama bin Laden is more likely to be hiding in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. There have been two attempts on Musharraf's life that were likely carried out by Islamic fundamentalists. In addition to problems on his Afghan border, where in the past the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI supported the Taliban, Musharraf has the Kashmir crisis on his border with India. Pakistan's rivalry with India was the driving force behind its development of nuclear weapons, but now it's the Muslim state with the Muslim bomb to counter Israel's atomic bomb.

Pakistan's A.Q. Khan was out selling nuclear equipment to any buyer, regardless of their terrorist credentials. He sold to North Korea and to Libya. It was only after Libya turned state's evidence that we found out about this aspect of Khan's activities. When we did, Pakistan only lightly slapped his hand, since he is a national hero for developing the Pakistani bomb, and the Pakistani government has kept our intelligence agents from talking to him to find out who else he may have been selling to.

Meanwhile, Russia has many nuclear weapons left over from the Cold War, some small enough to fit into a suitcase. In addition, it has many unemployed or underemployed nuclear scientists who might be willing to work for bad guys in order to keep their families fed. The Nunn-Lugar Act was designed to deal with the these problems in the former Soviet Union, but in the last few years the Bush administration has done little to implement it, leaving much exposed risk in Russia.

One Party Democracy in Iraq?

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said Thursday that if elections in Iraq couldn't be held in 100% of the country, "So be it." Because the no-go areas are in the Sunni triangle, it means a lot of Sunnis don't get to vote, thus favoring the Shiites and the Kurds of the three major Iraqi factions. Shia Grand Ayatollah Sistani was a big help in settling the conflict in Najaf; so, it makes political sense for the US to pay him back by favoring the Shias in the election, although it's not very democratic. But hey, even if the elections are not much more democratic than they were under Saddam, at least our guys are winning.

It's not clear, however, whether the Shias are our guys. They are very close to the Shias in Iran, who seem bent to building an atomic bomb against America's wishes. It seems that the short term benefit of holding an election (of any kind) in Iraq trumps the long term threat of nuclear destruction.

Rumsfeld was quickly upstaged by President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi, who said that elections would be held on time, while not contradicting Rumsfeld's statement that they might not be held throughout the whole country. Secretary of State Powell was sent out to the Sunday talk shows to smooth the rough edges of Rumsfeld's remarks.

But the truth is sometimes hard to hide. Today, according to the BBC, Jordan's King Abdullah said, "It seems impossible to me to organize indisputable elections in the chaos we see today.... Only if the situation improved could an election be organized on schedule." Maybe friends don't let friends hold meaningless elections.

Nuclear Non-Nuclear Powers

If the Bush Administration is going to make the world safer from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is going to have to figure out how to handle nuclear proliferation, which is the most serious type of proliferation in terms of the number of lives that are threatened by it. There is much talk of revising the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been relatively successful, but which has failed to prevent proliferation in a few very important cases -- India, Pakistan, and Israel.

The NPT differs in its treatment of nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. Nuclear weapons states are those that exploded a nuclear devices before 1967 -- the US, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. Russia took on the Soviet Union's designation as a nuclear weapons state. Everybody else is a non-nuclear weapons state. Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan have not signed the NPT, which is where the rub comes in, because India and Pakistan have both exploded nuclear devices, and Israel is widely known to possess a number of nuclear devices, although it may never exploded one. Israel may have tested one in South Africa in 1979, but exactly what happened when a US satellite reported that it saw a nuclear explosion in 1979 has never been unambiguously explained.

One problem is that the nuclearization since 1967 of these previously non-nuclear states has never been satisfactorily dealt with by the NPT. Their possession of nuclear weapons has been de facto accepted by the world, and they are not in violation of the NPT, because they never joined it. Iran is a member, and North Korea was a member.

A second problem is that the possession of nuclear weapons remains an indication of national greatness. Countries that aspire to world stage greatness, such as Brazil, are unlikely to say it is okay to accept India's nuclear status, but deny it to us. The NPT regime either has to sanction countries that go nuclear, or it has to allow other countries to go nuclear.

The third problem, then, is that the NPT calls on all nuclear powers to get rid of their nuclear arsenals, or at least to work toward disarmament, but they have not done so. There was progress for a while with the various SALT and START negotiations, but these are now ancient history. So, it's been accepted that once a country goes nuclear, it can stay nuclear.

The are a number of proposals to update or strengthen the NPT, but they don't deal with this problem. Until they do, it is unlikely that the NPT will be able to deal with the issue of new nuclear powers, which could include North Korea in the short term, Iran in the medium term, and perhaps Brazil in the long term.