Brazil Vows to Continue Space and Nuclear Programs
Space Daily reported that Brazil does not want the world to misunderstand its space or nuclear programs, because both have only peaceful and civilian objectives in mind, according to Eduardo Campos, Brazil's Minister of Science and Technology. Since our space program was born during the years of military rule, we have to make sure that we make the transition to a fully civil program, with a focus on showing our society that it is just as important to predict the weather as it is to build a road, Campos told United Press International.
Space
Campos also indicated that Brazil is determined to pursue development of its VLS national rocket program, despite previous failures and U.S. concerns about ballistic-missile, dual-use technology [i.e., under the MTCR]. The president has made a commitment to launch the VLS by 2006, Campos said, and it is an important program to our nation.
The United States shouldn't have any worries about the development of the VLS. He called the United States a great partner in the development of our intellectual capital in this regard, and added that the U.S. government has technical cooperation with us in all the areas that you can imagine. They also know that Brazil has the conditions to have a program such as the VLS.
Campos said Brazilian officials currently are in discussions with the United States about a new Technology Safeguards Agreement, which would permit U.S. rockets or payloads with U.S. components - such as satellites - to be launched from Alcantara, the country's space facility. Brazil previously had signed a TSA with the United States, but the agreement was not ratified by the Brazilian Congress when objections were raised - both in the legislature and the media - that certain restrictions included in the agreement infringed upon the country's sovereignty. (When Brazil talks about its sovereignty, it is serious, but it also means, "We're not going to agree to anything less than other countries are allowed to do, including the United States, China and India.")
Nuclear
Campos went out of his way to emphasize that the United States and the world should also not be concerned about Brazil's nuclear program, despite a recent dispute concerning U.N. inspections of one of the country's uranium enrichment facilities.
Brazil's nuclear program began in the same environment as the space program, Campos said, but later the Brazilian constitutional revision of 1989 established that it was to be a program with peaceful purposes. Brazil is one of the few nations in the world that has all of its installations - civil and military - licensed by all the international agencies.
Campos said Brazil has adhered very strongly to international, nuclear non-proliferation agreements. Last week, Brazil reached an agreement with the United Nations to allow inspections of its uranium enrichment plant outside of Rio de Janeiro, although the limited inspections will not permit access to certain areas. The limitations are meant to protect the country's proprietary technology, according to the country's Ministry of Science and Technology.
Monday, October 11, 2004
Saturday, October 09, 2004
Indian Prime Minister Rejects Joining NPT
The Hindu newspaper reported on Friday that, "The Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, said today that the circumstances were 'not ripe' for India to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 'right now'. Dr. Singh, however, said that India was voluntarily fulfilling the commitments that went along with being a responsible nuclear power acting with 'due restraint'". Answering a question at a joint press conference with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Dr. Singh said, "We are a nuclear power.... We have a no-first use doctrine in place."
He continued, "Also, we have an impeccable record of export controls so that any unauthorised use of sensitive nuclear materials can be effectively prevented." As the Hindu said, India has consistently taken the position that the NPT is unequal and discriminatory and that it will not sign the treaty. The pressure on New Delhi to sign it mounted after the May 1998 nuclear tests, but there has been no change in India's position on the issue.
The Prime Minister made it clear that India was interested in working with like-minded countries in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation system. Without referring to Pakistan or the A.Q. Khan network by name, he said that India had seen the clandestine export of nuclear materials in "our" region.
The Hindu newspaper reported on Friday that, "The Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, said today that the circumstances were 'not ripe' for India to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 'right now'. Dr. Singh, however, said that India was voluntarily fulfilling the commitments that went along with being a responsible nuclear power acting with 'due restraint'". Answering a question at a joint press conference with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Dr. Singh said, "We are a nuclear power.... We have a no-first use doctrine in place."
He continued, "Also, we have an impeccable record of export controls so that any unauthorised use of sensitive nuclear materials can be effectively prevented." As the Hindu said, India has consistently taken the position that the NPT is unequal and discriminatory and that it will not sign the treaty. The pressure on New Delhi to sign it mounted after the May 1998 nuclear tests, but there has been no change in India's position on the issue.
The Prime Minister made it clear that India was interested in working with like-minded countries in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation system. Without referring to Pakistan or the A.Q. Khan network by name, he said that India had seen the clandestine export of nuclear materials in "our" region.
Friday, October 08, 2004
My Anti-Bush is Nader
The Democrats think their call for anybody but Bush means voting for Kerry. But for me it means voting for Nader. I don't like Bush, but I don't like Kerry either. Why I don't like Bush should be pretty clear from other postings on this blog.
There are two main reasons that I don't like Kerry. As a Vietnam veteran, I didn't like his accusations that all Vietnam vets are war criminals, although his campaign says that he didn't believe this, that he was just reporting what other people said at some Detroit anti-war conference. I don't buy it. He may not have believed it, but he was using those accusations, which were well received by the left in those days to advance his career. It obviously worked; he's the Democrats' candidate for President.
The second reason I don't like Kerry is his position on the Middle East. The main reason for the unrest in the Middle East is Israel, and America's unquestioning support for Ariel Sharon. George Bush's obsequious, puppy-like devotion to Sharon's every whim is embarrassing to the United States. The latest is Dov Weisglass' statement that Sharon's Gaza policy is intended to freeze the peace process, and Bush's cowardly acceptance of it. Unfortunately, Kerry's position on Israel, as on Iraq, is almost identical to Bush's. In Israel, it appears that there is some lively debate about Sharon's hard line policy. In America, the Jewish community is solidly behind Sharon, which apparently means that both major political parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, unquestioningly support his bloodly, oppressive policies. Senator Edward's answer to Gwin Ifill's question on Israel during the Vice Presidential debate showed how devoted they are to Israel regardless of Israel's persecution of the Palestinians.
So, Nader is my man.
The Democrats think their call for anybody but Bush means voting for Kerry. But for me it means voting for Nader. I don't like Bush, but I don't like Kerry either. Why I don't like Bush should be pretty clear from other postings on this blog.
There are two main reasons that I don't like Kerry. As a Vietnam veteran, I didn't like his accusations that all Vietnam vets are war criminals, although his campaign says that he didn't believe this, that he was just reporting what other people said at some Detroit anti-war conference. I don't buy it. He may not have believed it, but he was using those accusations, which were well received by the left in those days to advance his career. It obviously worked; he's the Democrats' candidate for President.
The second reason I don't like Kerry is his position on the Middle East. The main reason for the unrest in the Middle East is Israel, and America's unquestioning support for Ariel Sharon. George Bush's obsequious, puppy-like devotion to Sharon's every whim is embarrassing to the United States. The latest is Dov Weisglass' statement that Sharon's Gaza policy is intended to freeze the peace process, and Bush's cowardly acceptance of it. Unfortunately, Kerry's position on Israel, as on Iraq, is almost identical to Bush's. In Israel, it appears that there is some lively debate about Sharon's hard line policy. In America, the Jewish community is solidly behind Sharon, which apparently means that both major political parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, unquestioningly support his bloodly, oppressive policies. Senator Edward's answer to Gwin Ifill's question on Israel during the Vice Presidential debate showed how devoted they are to Israel regardless of Israel's persecution of the Palestinians.
So, Nader is my man.
Thursday, October 07, 2004
Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, Me, and the Bomb
On October 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Brazilian Minister Celso Amorim while Powell was visiting Brazil. When I was assigned to the US Embassy in Brasilia as science officer during the 1980s, Celso Amorim was serving as the Foreign Ministry representative in the Ministry of Science and Technology. According to his bio, he held this job from 1985-88.
The US wanted to have a big meeting in Brazil to discuss scientific and technological cooperation, with the US side led by President Bush I's science adviser, Allan Bromley of Yale. Celso Amorim was not a big fan of the US, was not enthusiastic about the meeting, and stonewalled for a long time. Eventually we held the meeting, but there was not much agreement on joint projects. There was a lot of hand waving and agreements to agree later on specific projects.
During Powell's visit, there was discussion of Brazil's cooperation with IAEA inspectors who are scheduled to come to Brazil. There has been a question whether they would be allowed to inspect Brazil's plant for making uranium fuel for its nuclear power reactors. Brazil bought a huge nuclear fuel cycle plant from Germany before I was there in the 1980s. Then there was concern that Brazil would use it to highly enrich uranium to a level useful for bombs. That uranium enrichment process was very inefficient and cumbersome. Recently there have been rumors that Brazil purchased a more efficient centrifuge enrichment system from A.Q. Khan and Pakistanis, and for that reason would restrict the IAEA inspection.
When asked about the nuclear issue, Powell said, "I don’t think Brazil could be talked about in the same vein or put in the same category as Iran or North Korea.... In the case of Iran, Iran has been not forthcoming with respect to what it has been doing and we have seen the IAEA prying information out of Iran and our judgment is that Iran’s program is not just for power, but is also designed to move in the direction of a nuclear weapon. In the case of Brazil, this is simply not the case."
Following Secretary Powell's remarks, Celso Amorim said, "I won't go into the technical details, because I have no expertise to do that. But, it’s a simple matter. Brazil has nothing to hide in terms of its uranium enrichment process except for the technology that Brazil has acquired, and which Brazil naturally wishes to protect. It's perfectly possible, and this has been discussed very productively in Vienna. I, myself, was on the telephone with the director of the Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. El Baradei, who was very pleased with the contacts that he had made with our technical people. And, therefore, I believe it is perfectly possible to conciliate the objectives of the Atomic Energy Agency, to give them the certainty that the entire enrichment process is only for peaceful purposes, that there is no deviation of uranium, while at the same time protecting the Brazilian technology.
"Specifically how that's to be done has to be discussed between the Agency's technical people and the Brazilian authorities in the sector, specifically at the Resende plant that will be visited. It is in our interest to solve this problem, because we want to put the Resende plant into operation, as we have economic needs. Brazil is such a huge country, we cannot do without any source of energy. Brazil has major uranium reserves, and it's only natural that we do not want to have to send our uranium abroad to be enriched, to then have to have to come back to Brazil. That just doesn't make sense....
"Now, in terms of the Additional Protocol, I'll repeat one thing that I've said many times: Brazil has never said that it would not sign, but there is a process of negotiation here I think that we will soon come to an agreement on the Resende plant. And that will help consolidate the subject for the future. But, I want to reiterate, as I said to Secretary Powell, that when Brazil adhered to the Nonproliferation Treaty we actually accepted the package deal. There are three basic elements there: nonproliferation, as such; the possibility of peaceful use of nuclear power with no restrictions, unless there is some specific suspicion on the country but now Secretary Powell has said that there is none; and, third, concrete steps towards disarmament. Within that spirit we will continue to work on these matters. And, I'm certain that as in all the other situations, Brazil has always shown its desire to cooperate with the global goals of nonproliferation and of disarmament, and will continue to work in that direction."
The Additional Protocol which Amorim mentioned gives the IAEA stronger authority for inspections than originally granted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Brazil did not join the NPT for years because it said that the NPT was discriminatory, giving more rights to nuclear powers like the US than to non-nuclear countries. When it finally joined, it did not agree to the additional protocol, and now will probably argue that the international community is trying to change the terms of the agreement after it has been signed. This happened to Brazil when it bought its first nuclear power reactor from Westinghouse in the US in the 1970s. After the billion dollar deal was signed, Congress passed a law saying that the US could not supply fuel for the reactor unless Brazil agreed to "full scope safeguards" (more intrusive than those Brazil had already agreed to) under the NPT. Brazil did not agree then and turned to Germany for future reactors and nuclear technology. Brazil bristled when the US refused to supply the fuel that it had agreed to supply, which was especially harmful coming on the heels of the OPEC embargo that had cut off Brazil's petroleum supply.
Part of my job in Brazil during the 1980s was to get Brazil to be more forthcoming on the nuclear safeguards issue. I was not very successful until the President of Argentina invited the President of Brazil to visit Bariloche, known to be the location of the primary Argentine nuclear research center. Removing an element of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear competition helped both countries move toward more responsible nuclear programs. But Brazil has always been nationalistic. It still did not join the NPT until years later. If the world allows India and Pakistan (not to mention Israel, North Korea, and perhaps some other countries) to join the nuclear club, then Brazil may well insist that it also has the right to join. I don't think there is any indication that Brazil would want nuclear weapons to threaten anybody, but it would not easily consign itself to second-class status in the world by giving up the nuclear option, if nuclear weapons are seen as a sign of great power status.
On October 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Brazilian Minister Celso Amorim while Powell was visiting Brazil. When I was assigned to the US Embassy in Brasilia as science officer during the 1980s, Celso Amorim was serving as the Foreign Ministry representative in the Ministry of Science and Technology. According to his bio, he held this job from 1985-88.
The US wanted to have a big meeting in Brazil to discuss scientific and technological cooperation, with the US side led by President Bush I's science adviser, Allan Bromley of Yale. Celso Amorim was not a big fan of the US, was not enthusiastic about the meeting, and stonewalled for a long time. Eventually we held the meeting, but there was not much agreement on joint projects. There was a lot of hand waving and agreements to agree later on specific projects.
During Powell's visit, there was discussion of Brazil's cooperation with IAEA inspectors who are scheduled to come to Brazil. There has been a question whether they would be allowed to inspect Brazil's plant for making uranium fuel for its nuclear power reactors. Brazil bought a huge nuclear fuel cycle plant from Germany before I was there in the 1980s. Then there was concern that Brazil would use it to highly enrich uranium to a level useful for bombs. That uranium enrichment process was very inefficient and cumbersome. Recently there have been rumors that Brazil purchased a more efficient centrifuge enrichment system from A.Q. Khan and Pakistanis, and for that reason would restrict the IAEA inspection.
When asked about the nuclear issue, Powell said, "I don’t think Brazil could be talked about in the same vein or put in the same category as Iran or North Korea.... In the case of Iran, Iran has been not forthcoming with respect to what it has been doing and we have seen the IAEA prying information out of Iran and our judgment is that Iran’s program is not just for power, but is also designed to move in the direction of a nuclear weapon. In the case of Brazil, this is simply not the case."
Following Secretary Powell's remarks, Celso Amorim said, "I won't go into the technical details, because I have no expertise to do that. But, it’s a simple matter. Brazil has nothing to hide in terms of its uranium enrichment process except for the technology that Brazil has acquired, and which Brazil naturally wishes to protect. It's perfectly possible, and this has been discussed very productively in Vienna. I, myself, was on the telephone with the director of the Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. El Baradei, who was very pleased with the contacts that he had made with our technical people. And, therefore, I believe it is perfectly possible to conciliate the objectives of the Atomic Energy Agency, to give them the certainty that the entire enrichment process is only for peaceful purposes, that there is no deviation of uranium, while at the same time protecting the Brazilian technology.
"Specifically how that's to be done has to be discussed between the Agency's technical people and the Brazilian authorities in the sector, specifically at the Resende plant that will be visited. It is in our interest to solve this problem, because we want to put the Resende plant into operation, as we have economic needs. Brazil is such a huge country, we cannot do without any source of energy. Brazil has major uranium reserves, and it's only natural that we do not want to have to send our uranium abroad to be enriched, to then have to have to come back to Brazil. That just doesn't make sense....
"Now, in terms of the Additional Protocol, I'll repeat one thing that I've said many times: Brazil has never said that it would not sign, but there is a process of negotiation here I think that we will soon come to an agreement on the Resende plant. And that will help consolidate the subject for the future. But, I want to reiterate, as I said to Secretary Powell, that when Brazil adhered to the Nonproliferation Treaty we actually accepted the package deal. There are three basic elements there: nonproliferation, as such; the possibility of peaceful use of nuclear power with no restrictions, unless there is some specific suspicion on the country but now Secretary Powell has said that there is none; and, third, concrete steps towards disarmament. Within that spirit we will continue to work on these matters. And, I'm certain that as in all the other situations, Brazil has always shown its desire to cooperate with the global goals of nonproliferation and of disarmament, and will continue to work in that direction."
The Additional Protocol which Amorim mentioned gives the IAEA stronger authority for inspections than originally granted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Brazil did not join the NPT for years because it said that the NPT was discriminatory, giving more rights to nuclear powers like the US than to non-nuclear countries. When it finally joined, it did not agree to the additional protocol, and now will probably argue that the international community is trying to change the terms of the agreement after it has been signed. This happened to Brazil when it bought its first nuclear power reactor from Westinghouse in the US in the 1970s. After the billion dollar deal was signed, Congress passed a law saying that the US could not supply fuel for the reactor unless Brazil agreed to "full scope safeguards" (more intrusive than those Brazil had already agreed to) under the NPT. Brazil did not agree then and turned to Germany for future reactors and nuclear technology. Brazil bristled when the US refused to supply the fuel that it had agreed to supply, which was especially harmful coming on the heels of the OPEC embargo that had cut off Brazil's petroleum supply.
Part of my job in Brazil during the 1980s was to get Brazil to be more forthcoming on the nuclear safeguards issue. I was not very successful until the President of Argentina invited the President of Brazil to visit Bariloche, known to be the location of the primary Argentine nuclear research center. Removing an element of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear competition helped both countries move toward more responsible nuclear programs. But Brazil has always been nationalistic. It still did not join the NPT until years later. If the world allows India and Pakistan (not to mention Israel, North Korea, and perhaps some other countries) to join the nuclear club, then Brazil may well insist that it also has the right to join. I don't think there is any indication that Brazil would want nuclear weapons to threaten anybody, but it would not easily consign itself to second-class status in the world by giving up the nuclear option, if nuclear weapons are seen as a sign of great power status.
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