It will be interesting to see how Fed Chairman Bernanke's rescue of the stock market works out. It may be easy to compare his approach with a less activist approach, since all the other central bank governors appear to be resisting the temptation to rescue their stock markets. The Bernanke put seems to have replace the Greenspan put, allowing big investors to maintain an option to sell their stocks at a higher price if the market goes down too much. In essence this administration has said that it will rescue the rich investors immediately, and maybe later it will do something for the small fry.
The Europeans so far seem to think that the stock markets and the rich investors can take care of themselves. If they make some bad investments, they should have to live with them. This runs the risk of being a drag on the economy in the short term, but it gets the trash out of the financial system and creates a foundation for future growth. Bernanke and Greenspan are acting in the present, but are they mortgaging the future? Greenspan had twenty good years, which argues that his approach may work out. But the turmoil we have today is at least in part due to Greenspan's decision to keep credit cheap and let the good times roll.
Thursday, January 24, 2008
Friday, December 14, 2007
Banks in Trouble
An excellent op-ed in Friday's Wall Street Journal (which I can't access on the web) explained the credit crunch problem well to me, and why the Fed has so far been unable to solve it.
The problem is that banks don't trust each other. Therefore, it's clear that there is another shoe to drop. Banks have expanded their risks enormously because they used securitization (selling loans as some kind of paper) to get loans off of their books. If the loans stayed on their books, the banks would have been limited in their loan making by their capital and their access to funds. Once banks were close to being limited in making loans by the size of their capital, the Fed could regulate new lending by expanding or limiting the banks access to additional funds.
If they moved the loans off of their books, however, they were never limited. Furthermore, at least in theory, moving the loans off of their books also moved the risk off. But now all of this junk that the banks thought they had gotten rid of is coming back home. Citibank has recently taken several of the "SIV" off-books sham entities it created back onto its own books, thus limiting the amount of new lending it can do.
To the extend that Citibank or other banks become capital limited, the Fed can help in its traditional way. However, if the majority of the loans are floating around as commercial paper being held by who knows who, there is not much the Fed can do. In essence the banks created money that was beyond the control of the Fed.
The rub is that the banks know how much trash is out there, because they know how much trash they sold. Therefore, banks are reluctant to lend to other banks, because they don't trust the other bank to stay solvent to repay the loan. The scary thing is that the banks know better than anybody what risk is out there, and they are too scared to lend to their colleagues. That makes it look bad.
Everybody talks about the subprime housing crisis, but what if there is other bad stuff out there. Banks have been "securitizing" everything, getting loans off their books. What about credit card debt? Car loans? Business loans? If banks lowered their lending standards considerably in these other sectors as they did for mortgages, won't some of them start to go belly up, too?
Paul Krugman has an article in the NYT saying that we are in more than a liquidity crisis. A liquidity crisis is when you have the capacity to pay off a loan, but you just don't have the cash on you. In this case, somebody (the Fed) can loan you the money to pay it off now, and then you can pay them (the Fed) off later as you continue to get salary paychecks, or your house finally sells, or whatever. But if you can never pay off the loan, it's a different problem. The money is gone for good. In this case the banks may have paid themselves huge profits on bad loans in a giant ponzi scheme. If the debtor can never pay, a Fed loan is not going to help. It may be that the banks believe this, and that's why they won't lend to each other.
If only a small percentage of the loans are bad, the system can handle it, but at some point this could grow from a liquidity crisis into a financial crisis.
The problem is that banks don't trust each other. Therefore, it's clear that there is another shoe to drop. Banks have expanded their risks enormously because they used securitization (selling loans as some kind of paper) to get loans off of their books. If the loans stayed on their books, the banks would have been limited in their loan making by their capital and their access to funds. Once banks were close to being limited in making loans by the size of their capital, the Fed could regulate new lending by expanding or limiting the banks access to additional funds.
If they moved the loans off of their books, however, they were never limited. Furthermore, at least in theory, moving the loans off of their books also moved the risk off. But now all of this junk that the banks thought they had gotten rid of is coming back home. Citibank has recently taken several of the "SIV" off-books sham entities it created back onto its own books, thus limiting the amount of new lending it can do.
To the extend that Citibank or other banks become capital limited, the Fed can help in its traditional way. However, if the majority of the loans are floating around as commercial paper being held by who knows who, there is not much the Fed can do. In essence the banks created money that was beyond the control of the Fed.
The rub is that the banks know how much trash is out there, because they know how much trash they sold. Therefore, banks are reluctant to lend to other banks, because they don't trust the other bank to stay solvent to repay the loan. The scary thing is that the banks know better than anybody what risk is out there, and they are too scared to lend to their colleagues. That makes it look bad.
Everybody talks about the subprime housing crisis, but what if there is other bad stuff out there. Banks have been "securitizing" everything, getting loans off their books. What about credit card debt? Car loans? Business loans? If banks lowered their lending standards considerably in these other sectors as they did for mortgages, won't some of them start to go belly up, too?
Paul Krugman has an article in the NYT saying that we are in more than a liquidity crisis. A liquidity crisis is when you have the capacity to pay off a loan, but you just don't have the cash on you. In this case, somebody (the Fed) can loan you the money to pay it off now, and then you can pay them (the Fed) off later as you continue to get salary paychecks, or your house finally sells, or whatever. But if you can never pay off the loan, it's a different problem. The money is gone for good. In this case the banks may have paid themselves huge profits on bad loans in a giant ponzi scheme. If the debtor can never pay, a Fed loan is not going to help. It may be that the banks believe this, and that's why they won't lend to each other.
If only a small percentage of the loans are bad, the system can handle it, but at some point this could grow from a liquidity crisis into a financial crisis.
Monday, December 10, 2007
Chalabi's Back
Ahmad Chalabi is back in power in Iraq. I had been wondering what happened to him. The LA Times reports that he is now in charge of restoring the Baghdad infrastructure -- electricity, water, trash collection, etc. No doubt he is using to good personal advantage his ability to give away politically valuable stuff that is paid for by someone else, probably the US. Since he was one of the main people responsible for starting the Iraq war, it is not surprising that he is benefiting from it. His ability to make Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz his puppets who danced to his instructions showed how clever he is. Now, to come back like the phoenix from the ashes of his banishment from Baghdad shows it again. It probably does not bode well for Iraq, since Chalabi is much more interested in helping himself than in helping Iraq. It just shows how American policy in Iraq has failed, failed, failed, while Chalabi has won, won, won at America's expense, figuratively and literally.
Wednesday, November 21, 2007
How Are Services in Baghdad?
There has been a lot of press about how well the surge is working in Baghdad and how many people are returning from Syria and Jordan. But how well is the reconstruction of the Iraqi infrastructure going? Until now, a major problem has been security. We couldn't build things like sewage plants, electrical generation stations, etc., because people kept getting killed working on them. Now what's it like? How many hours do Baghdad residents have electricity? Do they have water?
The other question is what has happened to the neighborhoods? Has violence dropped because the neighborhoods have been ethnically cleansed, because neighborhoods that were once mixed Sunni and Shiite are now only one or the other?
And, has the violence dropped because we defeated al Qaeda and other opponents, or have they just faded into the woodwork until the surge is over? It appears that the surge is about over. Troops are coming home that are not being replaced, because there are no troops to replace them.
It looks like the surge proved that we needed more troops than we had for most of the war. Why did it take us four years to learn that? Just how bad are our military planners and leaders?
The other question is what has happened to the neighborhoods? Has violence dropped because the neighborhoods have been ethnically cleansed, because neighborhoods that were once mixed Sunni and Shiite are now only one or the other?
And, has the violence dropped because we defeated al Qaeda and other opponents, or have they just faded into the woodwork until the surge is over? It appears that the surge is about over. Troops are coming home that are not being replaced, because there are no troops to replace them.
It looks like the surge proved that we needed more troops than we had for most of the war. Why did it take us four years to learn that? Just how bad are our military planners and leaders?
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